Higher Education, Hopwood, and Homogeneity: Preserving Affirmative Action and Diversity in a Scrutinizing Society by Kostka, Kent
Denver Law Review 
Volume 74 Issue 1 Article 8 
January 2021 
Higher Education, Hopwood, and Homogeneity: Preserving 
Affirmative Action and Diversity in a Scrutinizing Society 
Kent Kostka 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Kent Kostka, Higher Education, Hopwood, and Homogeneity: Preserving Affirmative Action and Diversity 
in a Scrutinizing Society, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 265 (1996). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital 
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
COMMENTARY
HIGHER EDUCATION, HOPWOOD, AND HOMOGENEITY:
PRESERVING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY IN A
SCRUTINIZING SOCIETY
Visitors entering the expansive campus of the University of Texas at
Austin (U.T.) are greeted by a beautiful welcome center nestled in the comer
of the Martin Luther King Boulevard entrance. Named for the first African-
American to be admitted to the School of Law, the Heman Sweatt Campus'
boasts a restored nineteenth-century building converted into a monument to
U.T.'s rich history and heritage.2 Ironically, these tributes to advances in
diversity and racial equality are but a few blocks from one of the nation's
premier law schools 3-an institution that, under a recent Fifth Circuit ruling,
likely will be nearly all white by the turn of the century.4 Despite the hard-
fought and monumental legal victories of Sweatt5 and other civil rights pio-
neers, African-Americans in Texas and other states may once again find them-
selves looking to "separate but equal" schools for a legal education.6
1. Actually part of the U.T. campus, the Sweatt Campus, or "Little Campus," is a dedicated
memorial at the edge of University property, and is not a separate campus. Heman Sweatt was an
African-American who applied to the University of Texas School of Law (U.T. Law) in 1946, and
was rejected solely on the basis of his race. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950). At that
time, there were no law schools in Texas that admitted African-Americans, and in response to
Sweatt's suit, Texas established a "law school for Negroes." Id. at 631-32. The proposed institu-
tion was to have four members of U.T. Law's faculty who would teach at both schools while
maintaining offices only at U.T. Law. The library was to be less than one-sixth the size of U.T.
Law's, and the unaccredited school was to have no full-time librarian. Id. at 633.
2. The Sweatt campus encompasses two buildings, including a U.T. historical information
and visitor center, and, ironically, an admissions office.
3. See generally America's Best Graduate Schools, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Mar.
20, 1995, at 77, 84 (reviewing top graduate schools in the country, including law schools, and
ranking U.T. Law 17th). The criteria used to evaluate schools in this survey included quality of
the faculty, reputation of the program in the eyes of judges and the academic community, success
of recent alumni in the legal profession, selectivity of the student body, and job placement rates.
Id. at 84-85.
4. Lino A. Graglia, Hopwood v. Texas: Racial Preferences in Higher Education Upheld
and Endorsed, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 79, 79-80 (1995) (indicating that if the school's ordinary ad-
missions standards were applied to all applicants, African-Americans would likely constitute less
than one percent of the student body and Hispanics would constitute between two and three per-
cent). Similarly dire results have been forecast for California, where regents at the University of
California voted to eliminate gender and ethnicity as admissions criteria. Arleen Jacobius, Affirma-
tive Action on Way Out in California, 81 A.B.A. J. 22, 22 (1995).
5. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 636 (finding Texas' separate but equal educational systems in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment). Interestingly, the criteria used by the Supreme Court in deter-
mining the inequality of the institutions included library resources, "reputation of the faculty ...
position and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions, and prestige." Id. at
633-34. These assets are nearly identical to those widely used to evaluate and rank law schools
today. See supra note 3.
6. Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 573 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th
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Federal anti-discrimination law has evolved tremendously over the past
half-century, yet racial equality remains elusive. At the time Sweatt first
applied to U.T. School of Law (U.T. Law), formal segregation remained legal
under the fifty-year-old Plessy v. Ferguson7 decision which held that
separation did "not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race."8
Nonetheless, African-Americans continued to challenge the constitutionality of
such laws, particularly in education. The "separate but equal" approach was
finally rejected9 in Brown v. Board of Education° and Bolling v. Sharpe."
The interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment announced in those cases was
furthered over the next forty years by affirmative action programs 2 designed
to remedy the present effects of past discriminatory practices and prevent the
return of discrimination to American society.
In 1994, four white applicants to U.T. Law challenged the school's
affirmative action admissions program. 3 Originally developed as an attempt
to comply with Title VII, 4 the program gave preference to African-American
and Hispanic candidates."5 Although the district court found the program
unconstitutional, it nonetheless upheld the value of diversity in higher
education as a compelling government interest. 6 On appeal, however, the
Fifth Circuit held the program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and boldly suggested that diversity in higher
education can never justify race-conscious admissions policies. 7 The decision
sent shock waves rippling throughout the nation, and legal scholars quickly
proclaimed the case as the beginning of the end for affirmative action
programs in higher education."' Questions remain whether diversity in higher
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2580, 2581 (1996) [hereinafter Hopwood I] (noting that removing
race-conscious admissions from U.T. Law would, in effect, resegregate U.T. Law by directing
minority students to the traditionally African-American Texas Southern University Law School).
7. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. In a forward-looking dissent, Justice Harlan argued that "[olur
constitution is color-blind," and thus cannot allow classification among citizens. Id. at 559.
9. While the Court in Sweatt found that U.T. Law's admissions policy had violated the
Equal Protection Clause, it did not explicitly challenge the "separate but equal" doctrine. Instead,
the Court found that the altematve "Negro" institution was inferior to U.T. Law. See Sweatt, 339
U.S. at 633-34.
10. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
II. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (finding that the District of Columbia's segregated public
education system was unconstitutional).
12. For an explanation of the various forms of affirmative action programs, see generally
John Richard Carrigan & John J. Coleman, III, The Cloudy Future of Affirmative Action, 57 ALA.
LAW. 24, 24 (1996) (outlining several affirmative action concepts and noting their susceptibility to
recent court decisions).
13. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 553.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
15. Hopwood I, 861 F. Supp. at 558-63.
16. Id. at 578. The court found the separate admissions committees and the lack of compara-
tive evaluation between all candidates violated the Equal Protection Clause, holding that the pro-
gram was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve the compelling government interest of diversity. Id.
at 577-79.
17. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580, 2581
(1996) [hereinafter Hopwood Ill.
18. See Krista L. Cosner, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Lessons And Directions
from the Supreme Court, 71 IND. L.J. 1003, 1021 (1996) (stating that the court's application of
strict scrutiny in Hopwood 11 could have "far-reaching and devastating implications" for affirma-
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education is itself a compelling government interest and/or whether it serves
any necessary role in the battle against discrimination.
This paper will examine the Hopwood 11 decision, critique the rationale
used by the Fifth Circuit in overturning the district court, and present
arguments and proposals for protecting diversity in higher education as both a
compelling government interest and the appropriate means of preventing
discrimination. While it is important to understand the historical precedent and
jurisprudence behind the debate over affirmative action and diversity, it is
equally essential to accept the concrete and real-life effects these programs
have upon individuals of all backgrounds. Thus, interspersed within this paper
are several narratives about actual individuals whose lives have been
significantly affected by the affirmative action policy challenged in Hopwood
II.
I. THE HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN AMERICA
William grew up in a small town in East Texas and attended U.T. with the
help of race-based scholarships. A bright, enthusiastic student, he graduated
with a 3.2 grade point average (GPA) in communications in 1987. William
was active in campus activities, and eager to attend law school. His test
scores were average, but as an African-American he received special
consideration under U.T. Law's affirmative action plan. Today he works for a
small civil rights law firm in Houston, and donates many hours of work to
assist indigent and needy minority clients.
"If it weren't for the special consideration I received," William confides,
"I would have never been able to attend U. T. as a law student." He feels that
affirmative action is necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination as
well as to overcome the institutionalized hurdles that still exist for minorities.
"Growing up in East Texas makes you learn that there is still a long way to
go for African-Americans. Most Anglos don't understand that all African-
Americans still face many forms of discrimination and bias. I challenge
anyone to visit my high school and drive through the rural poverty and
despair that I grew up in and tell me honestly that America is past the point
of discrimination, intentional or not. Without the opportunities I was given, I
might still be there today."1
9
A. Progress and Programs
William's story epitomizes the struggle of many African-Americans,
particularly those in the South. The many benefits he received from racial
tive action programs); see also Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity,
and the California Civil Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1149-51 (1996) (criti-
cizing Hopwood II as "an extremist version of the color-blind vision" and stating that such an ap-
proach is "a reactionary call to return to the race relations of the nineteenth century").
19. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (July 8, 1996). The names of
and other identifying information about the U.T. Law applicants interviewed in this article have
been changed at their request.
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considerations in higher education were precisely what remedial affirmative
action programs were designed to accomplish.
Affirmative action grew from the Reconstruction-era Constitutional
Amendments and the legislation that accompanied the amendments.2 °
Following the Civil War, Congress implemented several programs intended to
assimilate freedmen into society and prevent discrimination.2' While these
programs gave preference to African-Americans on the basis of their race,
they remained constitutionally valid in the context of the legislative intent
behind the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Modem affirmative action emerged in
the 1960s with President Kennedy's order to federal contractors to "promote
and ensure equal opportunity for all qualified persons, without regard to race,"
and use "affirmative action" to implement the order. Congress then
incorporated Executive Order 10,925 into Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,24 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, or
national origin in programs receiving federal funds and in places of
employment. In 1965, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,246 which
prohibited all government contractors from discriminating on the basis of
race. 25
20. After the Civil War, Congress established the Freedman's Bureau to provide relief and
assistance to former slaves. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507. Nine months later, Con-
gress amended the Act by providing educational assistance to former slaves. Act of July 16, 1966,
ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173. Although controversial, the legislation was less than what many called for,
and the programs were quickly dismantled. See CLAUDE F. OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE:
THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP 181-83 (1978). For an in-depth look at
the history of affirmative action within the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and post-Civil
War congressional legislation, see generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985).
21. Herbert 0. Reid, Sr., Assault on Affirmative Action: The Delusion of a Color-Blind
America, 23 How. L.J. 381, 427 (1980); see also KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECON-
STRUCTION 1865-1877 (1965). The debate over affirmative action is primarily between two com-
peting value models: those who see affirmative action as an equalizer, and those who see it as
contrary to the ideal of a color-blind constitutional jurisprudence. The arguments made today bear
an uncanny resemblance to century-old congressional debates over Reconstruction-era remedial
legislation to benefit ex-slaves. Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CON-
STITrrIONAL LAW 256-57 (2d ed. 1996).
22. Carl E. Brody, Jr., A Historical Review of Affirmative Action and the Interpretation of Its
Legislative Intent by the Supreme Court, 29 AKRON L. REV. 291, 292-93 (1996) (arguing that con-
structionist jurisprudence demands a more lenient level of analysis than strict scrutiny when the
legislative intent can be clearly inferred); see also Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 309-16 (1991) (noting that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment also passed race-conscious legislation designed to benefit ex-slaves, and
that race-neutral jurisprudence ignores the original intent behind the Fourteenth Amendment).
Since Congress passed these programs soon after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, it
seems logical to assume that the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment must have been
compatible with race-conscious remedial measures.
23. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
24. See Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352. 78 Stat. 241
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. (1994)).
25. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1994). The original language of affirmative action orders appear to have been race-
neutral, and thus geared merely toward eliminating discrimination. The Johnson administration,
however, gradually redefined affirmative action as result-oriented hiring plans that gave
preferences to racial minorities. DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 7-8 (Nicolaus Mills, ed., 1994).
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B. The Battle Over the Level of Judicial Scrutiny
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court upheld race-conscious remedies
for past discrimination in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
167Education.6 After that decision, affirmative action plans became common."
In 1980, the Supreme Court upheld a congressionally-mandated federal
affirmative action program for government construction contracts in Fullilove
v. Klutznick."8 In 1989, however, the Court struck down a similar state-
mandated program in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.'9 In both cases,
the Court applied a two-prong test, requiring that a race-based classification be
narrowly tailored" to achieve a compelling government interest.3 The feder-
al program survived the test, while the state program did not. This difference
in result may have been based upon the premise that, as a "co-equal branch,"
Congress is entitled to deference above and beyond that which states should
receive.3  In 1990, the Supreme Court clarified the Fullilove/Croson
distinction in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.33 Defining diversity as an
important government objective, the Court held that congressionally-mandated
programs should be subject to intermediate scrutiny.34 The Court's ruling
created controversy and drew calls for a uniform standard of review.35 In a
scathing dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should apply strict
scrutiny,36 decrying the "renewed toleration of racial classifications."3
26. 402 U.S. 1, 15-31 (1971) (charging state and local governments with the "affirmative
obligation[]" to take steps necessary to end discrimination, and holding that the remedial power of
courts to remedy past discrimination is broad).
27. See Lara Hudgins, Rethinking Affirmative Action in the 1990s: Tailoring the Cure to
Remedy the Disease, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 815, 816-20 (1995).
28. 448 U.S. 448, 478 (1980) (granting deference to congressional race-based actions when
Congress found a long history of discrimination and intended to combat the present effects of past
discrimination). While the Court did not define the level of review appropriate for evaluating
congressional race-based actions, Justices Burger and Powell stated that even strict scrutiny would
have been satisfied. See id. at 491-92; see also id. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring); Jerome R.
Watson & Akinyale Harrison, Government Contracting: Affirmative Action After Adarand, 74
MICH. B.J. 1162, 1162 (Nov. 1995).
29. 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test for evaluat-
ing state and local programs that classify on the basis of race). In distinguishing the case from
Fullilove, the Court noted that the deference granted to congressional findings of historical dis-
crimination does not extend to states and municipalities. Id. at 498-511.
30. "Narrowly tailored" has been defined to include several restrictions. A program must be
limited in scope and duration, must not unduly burden third parties, and cannot stand if there
exists a less intrusive alternative. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
31. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506. "Compelling government interests" have rarely been held
to exist outside the realm of remedying the present effects of past discrimination. Id. at 494-506.
32. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 472 (noting that Congress is charged specifically with enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment through legislation).
33. 497 U.S. 547, 566 (1990) (granting deference to Congress in mandating race-conscious
measures to achieve broadcast diversity, and holding that such federal programs must be evaluated
under "intermediate scrutiny"), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097 (1995).
34. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65 (defining intermediate scrutiny as requiring
race-based laws to be substantially related to an important government objective). In general,
intermediate scrutiny has been reserved for gender-based classifications. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976).
35. Watson, supra note 28, at 1162-65 (suggesting Metro Broadcasting highlighted a judicial
inconsistency that the Court was forced to address in Adarand).
36. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 603 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia
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Following the five to four decision in Metro Broadcasting, the Supreme
Court sharply reversed itself in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena."
Adarand involved a congressionally-mandated affirmative action program for
minority business subcontractors. Holding that strict scrutiny analysis applies
to all racial classifications, regardless of the governmental entity that created
them,39 the Court implicitly rejected the idea that the government has an
important interest in bringing about diversity.' Expressly overruling Metro
Broadcasting,4 the Adarand Court reiterated that the level of review should
not depend upon which race is burdened by race-based classifications.42
Attempting to counter the perception that strict scrutiny is "fatal in fact,"
Justice O'Connor expressly noted that affirmative action programs could
conceivably meet the level of review set forth in Adarand.43 In his
concurrence, Justice Thomas criticized minority set-aside programs as "racial
paternalism," which he labelled "as poisonous and pernicious as any other
form of discrimination.""' Hailed as appropriately determining that even
"benign" race-based programs are nonetheless unconstitutional,4' Adarand has
drawn blistering criticism from those who believe affirmative action is still
justifiable as both a remedy for past discrimination 4' and a tool for creating
diversity."7
and Kennedy, J.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 610. O'Connor suggested that the goal of the affirmative action program devised
by the FCC was to achieve racial balancing rather than diversity, and questioned the "fit" of the
means to achieve the FCC's stated goal. Id. at 625 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
suggested the decision "move[s] us from 'separate but equal' to 'unequal but benign."' Id. at 637-
38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
38. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
39. Id. at 2111 (stating that courts must require "any governmental actor subject to the Con-
stitution [to] justify any racial classification subjecting [people] to unequal treatment under the
strictest judicial scrutiny").
40. Stephen C. Minnich, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena-A Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative
Action, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 279, 280 (1995). In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens argued
that diversity can be a compelling government interest because the Adarand opinion overruled
Metro Broadcasting only in the determination of the proper level of scrutiny for racial classifica-
tions. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2127.
41. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113 (stating explicitly that all racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny, which requires a narrowly tailored measure that furthers a compelling government
interest).
42. Id. at 2111 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
43. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 (citing Paradise, 480 U.S. at 167, as demonstrating an
appropriately narrowly-tailored measure meeting strict scrutiny).
44. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
45. See Brian C. Eades, The United States Supreme Court Goes Color-Blind: Adarand Con-
structors, Inc. v. Pena, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 771, 771 (1996) (arguing that despite the deplor-
able problem of racial discrimination in this country, affirmative action is not the solution); see
also Minnich, supra note 40, at 280 (applauding Adarand's rejection of the notion that diversity
can constitute a compelling government interest).
46. See generally E'Vinski Davis, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Turning Back the
Clock on Minority Set-Asides, 23 S.U. L. REV. 79 (1995) (arguing that the Court should have
followed past precedent by granting deference to Congress in matters involving the Fourteenth
Amendment). In his dissent in Adarand, Justice Stevens basically argued the same principle, stat-
ing that the Court had deferred to Congress the past two times it addressed federal affirmative
action programs. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2126-27.
47. See Terrence M. Lewis, Comment, Standard of Review Under the Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection Component: Adarand Expands the Application of Strict Scrutiny, 34 DUQ. L.
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C. Affirmative Action in Higher Education
Katie graduated from U.T. with a marketing degree and immediately
applied to several law schools. She was surprised, however, when she was
denied admission to U.T. Law. Her 3.65 GPA and seventy-fifth percentile
LSAT, combined with many extracurricular achievements, earned her
immediate acceptance at several other top-quality institutions. After a brief but
successful time spent working toward an M.B.A., she applied again, this time
with a ninetieth percentile LSAT score and a graduate school GPA of 3.65.
Again she was denied admission to U.T. Law. Undeterred from a legal career,
she enrolled at Baylor, a private school in Waco, Texas, and graduated in
1994 near the top of her class. Her resumi at Baylor was enviable: she
graded onto Law Review; won top honors in moot court competitions; and,
made the school's nationally-acclaimed appellate team. Had it not been for
financial assistance, however, Katie would have been unable to meet the high
tuition at Baylor. Overall she was forced to spend over twice as much for law
school as she would have at U.T.
As an Anglo applicant, Katie knew all along that she faced a more
difficult admissions process at U. T., but still felt cheated by the fact that she
was unable to enjoy the benefits of low tuition, close proximity to home, and a
legal education at the state's most renowned and prestigious legal
institution." Had she been Hispanic or African-American, she likely would
have been admitted.49 Today she works as a litigator for a large Dallas law
firm. She is successful and happy, but still remains somewhat resentful.
Overall, she feels that she has reaped the benefits of a smaller school, but
acknowledges that "I wish the process had been more merit based, and not
contingent only upon the color of an applicant's skin. It was wrong to deny
admission to those with higher objective credentials."5
Katie's experiences with affirmative action illustrate the myriad problems
arising from affirmative action programs in higher education admissions. In
1973, the Supreme Court directly addressed this issue in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke." Writing for a precariously balanced five
to four majority,52 Justice Powell stated that affirmative action programs in
higher education admissions can be justified under two rationales: 1) creating
diversity53 in student populations; and, 2) remedying the present effects of
REV. 325, 350 (1996) (arguing that the Court ignored current racial disparities, discrimination, and
prejudice, and that the benefits of cultural diversity outweigh any possible harms to white contrac-
tors disadvantaged by the affirmative action program).
48. See U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, supra note 3, at 84 (ranking U.T. law considerably
higher in quality than any other Texas law school).
49. See Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. 557-63 (describing U.T. Law's admissions process and
affirmative action program).
50. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (July 10, 1996).
51. 8 U.S. 265 (1978). Although the Court found the particular program at issue to be un-
constitutional, its guidelines for affirmative action legitimized other programs. Id. at 315-20.
52. Donald L. Beschle, "You've Got to Be Carefully Taught": Justifying Affirmative Action
After Croson and Adarand, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1141, 1151-52 (1996) (noting the fragility of Bakke
and the forward-looking diversity rationale of Justice Powell).
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15. While Justice Powell found diversity to be a compelling state
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past discrimination.54 Categorizing the preference of one person over another
solely on the basis of race as "discrimination for its own sake,"55 Justice
Powell specifically stated that only documented discrimination at the
institution implementing the program justifies race-based action.56
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of race-based minority
scholarships in Podberesky v. Kirwan,57 holding that such programs are not
constitutional without a strong showing of the need for remedial measures to
combat the present effects of past discrimination. 8 In so holding, the court
also determined that "present effects" necessary to justify race-based remedial
action must be clearly tied to past discrimination.59 The court also
distinguished between present societal discrimination and past discrimination
by a university, holding that the "hostile-climate effect" argument' as a
justification for remedial action was insufficient to support a race-conscious
program." In finding poor reputation as insufficient grounds for the
establishment of race-based remedial programs,62 the court acknowledged
Maryland's history of discrimination, yet stated that "mere knowledge of
historical fact" cannot justify race-exclusive remedies.65 The court also
rejected the University's underrepresentation and attrition arguments.'
II. THE HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
Albert grew up in South Texas as the son of impoverished immigrant farm
workers. A bright student, he came to U. T. in 1981, uncertain of his future. He
worked his way through college and graduated with a "B" average in
psychology. As a Hispanic student, Albert was eligible for special
consideration under U.T. Law's admissions process, and was admitted in
interest, no other case since Bakke has accepted that rationale under a strict scrutiny analysis.
54. Id. at 300-12. Using the First Amendment as support for "academic freedom," Justice
Powell cited Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967). Stating that safeguarding academic freedom is a "national commitment" and
that the nation's future depends upon leaders "trained through wide exposure" to diverse ideas, he
noted the competing interests of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-13.
55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
56. Id. at 310. The Court upheld the application of strict scrutiny for state mandated racial
classifications in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986). In Wygant, the
Court used strict scrutiny to reject race-based layoff plans for teachers to remedy general societal
discrimination. Id. at 280.
57. 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995) (finding the Uni-
versity of Maryland's race-based scholarship program unconstitutional).
58. Id. at 153 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, and Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277). At controversy
was a merit-based scholarship program at the University of Maryland limited exclusively to Afri-
can-Americans. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 152.
59. Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153. The University claimed that there existed four clear effects
of past discrimination: (1) a poor reputation within the African-American community; (2)
underrepresentation of African-Americans in the student body; (3) low retention and graduation
rates for enrolled African-American students; and (4) an environment on campus perceived as
hostile to African-American students. Id. at 152.
60. Id. at 154. The University based much of its argument on the results of a student survey
that demonstrated student perceptions of social segregation and a racist environment. Id.
61. Id. at 153-55.
62. id. at 154.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 156-60.
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1986. He graduated in 1989 with average grades and today works in
immigration law in south-central Texas.
"People don't truly understand the problems facing many Hispanics in
Texas," Albert says, "and while there are some doors open now that never
existed before, there are still terrible obstacles in the way of many Hispanics.
Inadequate public education, a lack of health care, and racist politics
contribute to an environment that keeps Hispanics out of many parts of
society." He attributes his success, in part, to affirmative action programs and
race-based scholarships. "Without these kinds of tools, Hispanics will continue
to remain mired in poverty and illiteracy. We've been in Texas at least as long
as the Anglos. Why do you think we're only now seeing Hispanic elected
officials and businessmen?""5
The Texas educational system in which Albert was educated has long
been rife with racial discrimination and its effects.' While the landmark case
of Sweatt v. Painter67 invalidated the state law prohibiting African-Americans
from attending U.T. Law, it was not until 1983 that the State of Texas agreed
to implement a court-mandated plan to desegregate its higher education
system, including U.T. and U.T. Law.' As late as 1971, U.T. Law did not
have a single African-American student in its entering class.69
In 1977, under court order,7" the United States Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare's (HEW) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) began an
investigation of Texas' statewide higher educational system for discrimination.
In 1980, after a two-year investigation, OCR concluded that the State of
Texas' higher educational system remained segregated, and declared Texas in
violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' OCR also determined
that there was a severe underrepresentation of Hispanics as well as African-
Americans, and mandated that both categories of students must be included in
goals for a desegregation plan."
Texas submitted an initial desegregation plan shortly thereafter indicating
a commitment to equal educational opportunity and racial desegregation, but
65. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (June 28, 1996).
66. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 572 n.63 ("Texas' long history of discrimination against its
black and Hispanic citizens in all areas of public life is not the subject of dispute .... ) (quoting
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 866 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1071 (1994). Historically, a principal part of Southern politics, and those of Texas in
particular, has been the "maintenance of control [of African-Americans] by a white majority."
CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS IN TEXAS POLITICS 5 (1990).
67. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
68. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 556.
69. Id. at 558. Despite his monumental legal victory, Heman Sweatt dropped out of U.T.
Law in 1951 after enduring threats, violence, cross-burnings, and humiliation at the hands of stu-
dents and faculty. Id. at 555.
70. Adams v. Richardson, 356 F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C.), modified and affd, 480 F.2d 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 555-57.
72. Id. at 555-56. Historically, the population of Texas has been severely segregated along
both geographic and socioeconomic lines. JAMES ANDERSON ET AL., TEXAS POLITICS 27-30 (4th
ed. 1984).
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the OCR rejected it as deficient.73 In 1982, a revised plan again was rejected
as inadequate because it did not mandate specific goals for each institution. 4
In 1983, proceedings began against the State of Texas to enforce the
original judgment, and OCR recommended that Texas adopt a plan including
provisions admitting African-American and Hispanic students to higher
education programs who "demonstrate potential for success but do not
necessarily meet all the traditional admission requirements. 74 In June 1983,
OCR accepted Texas' third plan, the "Texas Plan," which had the stated goal
of having African-American and Hispanic students enter graduate schools at
ratios equal to their percentage of all college graduates within the State of
Texas.75
During this period of litigation concerning Texas' higher educational
system, much of the state's public school system was operating under court-
ordered desegregation plans intended to combat decades of educational
inequality.76 This segregation and discrimination was not limited to African-
Americans; in United States v. Crucial,77 the Fifth Circuit held that Ector
County had "clearly and egregious(ly)" violated the Constitution78 through
continued segregation of both African-Americans and Hispanics.79 At the
same time, the Dallas Independent School District was found to have
intentionally "opposed any student desegregation, no matter how feasible or
how minimal," thus failing to meet the requirements of a court-ordered
desegregation plan.8" Statewide, public school districts remain in
noncompliance with Justice Department requirements, and in many cases
actually have increased segregation of African-American and Hispanic
students. 8'
III. HoPWOOD IH
Kevin applied to U.T. Law in the spring of 1989, unsure about a legal
career but confident in his ability to succeed. Coming from a middle-class
background, his credentials were impressive: a 3.7 GPA in government from
U.T., top-quartile LSAT scores, three years experience with an Austin law
firm, and a "loaded" resume. He had been in countless academic and social
organizations, was president of the school's nationally famous marching band,
73. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 556.
74. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. & n.6. For example, if Afican-Americans had constituted ten percent of all college
graduates, the goal would have been for graduate programs to have entering classes that were ten
percent African-American. Acceptance of minority students was contingent, however, on state
funding for the projects and timely completion of certain activities. Id. at 556.
76. Id. at 554; see also DAVIDSON, supra note 66, at 115 (stating that Texas "inherited the
traditional black-white caste system").
77. 722 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. United States v. Crucial, 722 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 1184-85.
80. Tasby v. Wright, 713 F.2d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Crucial, 722 F.2d at 1188. Today, "white-flight" has also created a "de-facto
resegregation" in the suburbs of larger Texas cities. DAVIDSON, supra note 66, at 248.
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had worked and paid his way through school, and had glowing letters of
recommendation from professors and attorneys. To his surprise, however, he
received a quick letter of rejection.
After some soul-searching, Kevin looked to teaching as an alternative,
with overwhelming success. In his first year, he was selected Teacher-of-the-
Year for his school, and one year later he was selected as one of the top thirty
high school teachers in the state of Texas. Kevin completed a Master's Degree
in Educational Administration in August, 1996 as the outstanding student in
the graduate school, and currently serves as assistant principal in a small
town near Austin.
Despite his success in teaching, Kevin is still bitter about his rejection
from U.T. Law. Several of his nonwhite friends, all with lower LSAT scores
and GPAs, were admitted to U.T. Law. In particular, Kevin is bothered by the
admittance of a wealthy Hispanic friend who had been through private schools
all his life, yet qualified for U.T. Law under the affirmative action plan. Kevin
understands the need for opening up the School of Law to a more diverse
group of students, but feels that "when you categorize people simply by race
you open up a dangerous can of worms .... for everybody. I'm very happy
with my life today, but I'll never know what might have been."82
Kevin's story is not unusual. Like other Anglo applicants, his credentials
were impressive and diverse, yet inadequate to secure admission to U.T. Law.
In 1992, Cheryl Hopwood and three other Anglo plaintiffs applied for
admission to the University of Texas School of Law.83 The admissions policy
at the school measured all applicants using their "Texas Index," 4 and based
on this index each application was placed in one of three categories: 1)
presumptive admission; 2) discretionary admission; and 3) presumptive
denial."5 All four plaintiffs were placed in the second category. Candidates in
the first category were likely offered admission, those in the latter category
were usually denied admission, and those in the second category were referred
to a three-person committee for review. 6
Under the admissions policy in effect at the time,87 preferred
candidates88 were evaluated under a completely separate system which used
lower presumptive-admit and presumptive-deny "Texas Index" scores than
those used to evaluate non-minority applicants.89 The stated goal of the
program was to admit an entering class which included African-American and
Hispanic students in numbers approximately equal to the proportion they
represented of all Texas college graduates.' In addition, while ordinary
82. Telephone Interview with anonymous U.T. Law applicant (June 28, 1996).
83. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 564.
84. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 935. The index was a composite formula using the applicant's
undergraduate grade point average and LSAT score. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 935-36.
87. The admissions process at issue was discontinued in 1992. See generally Hopwood 1,
861 F. Supp. at 557-63 (describing the history and evolution of the U.T. Law admissions system).
88. African-Americans and Hispanics were the only preferred candidates. Hopwood 1I, 78
F.3d at 936 n.4.
89. Id. at 936.
90. Id. at 937. In 1992, these percentages were such that approximately eleven percent of the
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candidates placed in the discretionary category were evaluated by one or two
members of a committee, all preferred candidates were extensively evaluated
by a special minority subcommittee which discussed every discretionary
preferred application.9
After being denied admission, plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the
school's affirmative action program violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.92 The district court found part of the school's
program to be unconstitutional, but recognized a compelling state interest in
obtaining diversity and remedying the effects of past discrimination.93
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding the
school's program and use of diversity as grounds for race-conscious
admissions to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.94 Writing for the
court, Judge Smith stated that the "central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause 'is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between
individuals on the basis of race."'95 Such discrimination, the court stated, is
therefore highly suspect and subject to strict scrutiny." In applying strict
scrutiny, the court found that neither the diversity nor remedial arguments
presented by U.T. constituted a "compelling government interest.
'97
Directly addressing Bakke, the court stated that Justice Powell was
incorrect in determining that there exists a First Amendment right to academic
freedom sufficient to constitute a compelling government interest to use race
as an admissions factor.98 Quoting from Adarand, the court stated that the
"'failure [of] Bakke ... left unresolved the proper analysis for remedial race-
entering class was to be Hispanic and eight percent of the class was to be African-American. Id.
See also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
91. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 937. In addition to extensively reviewing each discretionary
application, the minority subcommittee also had "virtually final" say in the admissions process. Id.
Preferred students not presumptively admitted or placed in the discretionary category were even
placed on a separate preferred waiting list. Id. at 938.
92. Id. In finding the constitutional violation, the court held that U.T. Law could not use
race as a factor in admissions for the stated purposes of: (1) achieving diversity; (2) combating a
perceived hostile environment toward minorities at the school; (3) alleviating the school's poor
reputation in the minority community; or, (4) remedying the effects of past discrimination by
anyone other than U.T. Law. Id. at 952. The court did not address the possibility of present dis-
crimination by U.T. Law.
93. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 570 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 313 (1973) and United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 167 (1987)). The court acknowl-
edged the testimony of professors indicating the substantial value of having a diverse student
body. Furthermore, the court noted that had the 1992 admissions process been conducted without
the affirmative action plan, there would have been at most nine African-Americans and 18 Hispan-
ics among the approximately 900 students offered admission. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 563,
573.
94. Hopwood H, 78 F.3d at 934.
95. Id. at 939-40 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
96. Hopwood 1I, 78 F.3d at 940 (citing Adarand Construction v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113
(1995) and Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). The court declared the benign nature of
the U.T. affirmative action program irrelevant in determining the level of scrutiny. Hopwood IH, 78
F.3d at 940 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
97. Hopwood H, 78 F.3d at 945-55.
98. See id. at 944 (arguing that Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent
because, although he announced the opinion, no other Justices joined him in it). Judge Smith
stated that "any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving a
diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id.
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based government action.' The opinion also stated that the only case in
which diversity has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as a compelling
government interest, Metro Broadcasting, was explicitly overturned by
Adarand.'0
After rejecting the diversity argument, the court then addressed the issue
of remedial action as a compelling government interest. First, the court noted
that past decisions allowed for remedial action only in light of "present effects
of past discrimination."'' U.T. Law argued that racial criteria were justified
at U.T. Law to remedy the effects of past discrimination in the state's public
school system, but the court found that it erroneously used the improper unit
for analysis. 2 Under the strict reasoning of Croson and Wygant,0 3 the
court reasoned, the only past discrimination U.T. Law may address is that
which occurred within the law school itself." Stating that there is no
evidence of any existing discrimination, nor effects of past discrimination, the
court suggested that any existing racial tension is likely the product of societal
discrimination.'0 5
The University of Texas appealed to the Supreme Court, and although
many legal experts predicted the case would be accepted, the Court denied
certiorari."° In an unusual concurring opinion, Justices Ginsburg and Souter
acknowledged that the issue of race-conscious admissions policies in higher
education is "of great national importance," but agreed with the denial on the
grounds that because U.T. Law no longer used the challenged policy, the
Court must await "a final judgment on a program genuinely in controversy
before addressing [this] important question."07 While other circuits continue
to follow Bakke, the issue remains clearly unresolved and will undoubtedly
come before the Supreme Court again in a case with a justiciable
controversy.'0 8
99. Id. (quoting Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2109).
100. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944. The effects of past discrimination in Texas society are
incontrovertible. Between whites and minorities, both educational attainment and income vary
tremendously, and the state historically has a great disparity in wealth between whites and minori-
ties. African-Americans and Hispanics are far more likely than whites to be impoverished, under-
educated or unemployed. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 31-32.
101. Id. at 952 (citing Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 153 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995)).
102. See Hopwood H, 78 F.3d at 949-54.
103. The decisions in Croson and Wygant indicate that "racial remedies must be carefully
limited." Id. at 950.
104. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 952. The court presented the potential "slippery-slope" effects of
such remedial action, stating that if higher education can be analogized to affect the entire educa-
tional system, such programs legitimately could be extended to cover "any other state activity that
in some way is affected by the educational attainment of the applicants." Id. at 950.
105. Id. at 953. The court also postulated that current racial preferences actually contribute to
racial tensions rather than help alleviate them. Id.
106. Hopwood v. Texas, 116 S. Ct. 2580, 2581 (1996).
107. Id.
108. See generally Sylvia A. Law, Diversity in Jeopardy as Supreme Court Declines to Re-
view Hopwood, THE EQUALIZER, Aug. 1996, at 1, 4-5 (noting the implications of the denial of
review by the Supreme Court and suggesting that the Fifth Circuit's holding "effectively reverses
a Supreme Court decision" causing shocking effects that have reverberated throughout the nation-
wide academic community). While there are no pending cases before the Supreme Court address-
ing the Hopwood issues, so many law schools and institutions of higher education use affirmative
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IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF HOPWOOD 1H
In overturning the district court decision, the Fifth Circuit overstepped its
authority by attempting to predict the outcome of a potential Supreme Court
review rather than applying binding law.'" In holding U.T. Law to be the
proper scope for evaluating the validity of remedial action, the court turned a
blind eye to the pervasive and egregious racism present throughout society,
and Texas in particular, as well as the lingering effects of past state-sanctioned
racial discrimination."' The court also failed to recognize possible forms of
present discrimination in higher education based on flawed evaluations of
merit."
Completely disregarding Bakke, Judge Smith declared that Justice
Powell's diversity rationale was inadequate to pass strict scrutiny, and stated
that the only permissible grounds for race-based actions are remedial." 2 This
action policies similar to U.T. Law's program that college administrators and admissions staff are
scrambling to develop response strategies to possible court challenges in other circuits. Id. See
generally Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyl, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996)
(discussing the diversity rationale in depth and suggesting that the Supreme Court may choose to
preserve Bakke and the special consideration given to academic freedom). Other scholars have a
less optimistic viewpoint. Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1852
(1996) ("[alffirmative action Armageddon is at hand, and the legal fate of diversity will be the
richest prize at stake").
The ultimate effects on U.T. Law remain unknown. Dean M. Michael Sharlot pessimisti-
cally noted that the Supreme Court's decision "resulted in a great irony." While U.T. Law and
other schools located in the Fifth Circuit remain bound by Hopwood, other schools outside the
region, many of which have little or no history of state-sanctioned discrimination, are free to uti-
lize affirmative action programs. Combined with a recent Texas Attorney General's ruling that
financial aid must be administered in a race-neutral manner, Hopwood threatens to turn U.T. Law
"from being the nation's leading producer of African-American and Mexican-American lawyers to
one that will have very few members of these groups." Dean M. Michael Sharlot, Hopwood Up-
date, TEXAS ALCALDE COLLEGE ROUNDUP, in TEXAS ALCALDE, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 32D; see also
Avrel Seale, Sipping Tea With Bob Berdahl, TEXAS ALCALDE, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 23-24 (inter-
viewing University of Texas President, who notes that "[w]e're [now] at a terrific comparative dis-
advantage and there's no question but that we will have a very palpable, discernible decline in
minority enrollment, especially in certain programs").
109. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 943-44 (arguing that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is mere
dictum rather than binding law, and suggesting that Powell's diversity argument would not with-
stand strict scrutiny). See generally Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died: Affirmative Action's
Posthumous Life, THE NEW REPUBLIC, April 22, 1996, at 21, 24 (labeling Judge Smith's opinion
as "clumsy vote count[ingl" instead of the application of existing law). Furthermore, while it ap-
pears clear that U.T. Law's use of separate admissions committees and singular consideration of
race were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Powell's rationale in Bakke, the
Fifth Circuit went beyond simply holding the specific program unconstitutional and broadly ad-
dressed the general concepts of affirmative action and diversity in all higher education. See also
The Hon. Nathaniel R. Jones, The Harlan Dissent: The Road Not Taken--An American Tragedy,
12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 951, 971 (1996) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit's Hopwood 11 ruling as an
improper attempt to overrule Bakke, and suggesting that the U.T. administration's determination of
discriminatory effects at U.T. Law was made well within the boundaries of administrative compe-
tence).
110. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 554-57.
111. See infra notes 139-156 and accompanying text.
112. Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 944-45 (citing Adarand and Croson). Judge Smith also cited
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting, in which she stated "[mlodem equal protection
has recognized only one [compelling state] interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimina-
tion." Id. at 945 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor,
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tortured interpretation ignored part V-C of Bakke,"3 in which Justice Powell
was joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun." 4 In effect,
the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize the profound and compelling value of
diversity in higher education in general. Equally erroneous was the court's
failure to recognize the value of diversity in legal education as the necessary
and narrowly-tailored means to serve other compelling government interests.
Among these interests are preventing discrimination, preserving academic
freedom, serving the interests of the community, and creating access to the
law for all people.
A. Remedying Past Institutional Discrimination
The Hopwood 1I court ignored Texas' well-documented arguments about
remedying the present effects of past discrimination as well as the factual
evidence indicating strong lingering effects of past discrimination throughout
the state's educational system. Federal investigators examined the state's
higher education system in the mid-1970s," 5 and found pervasive and
egregious discrimination." 6  Although U.T. Law itself was formally
integrated in 1950, forms of state-sanctioned segregation at the law school
continued well into the 1960s." 7 While a small number of African-
Americans were admitted to U.T. Law during this period, as late as 1971 there
were still some entering classes which had no African-American students."8
Just as there were clear and offensive remnants of segregation twenty-one
years after the court-ordered integration of U.T. Law, equally unequivocal
signs exist today indicating that racial equality has not yet found its way to
many institutions of higher education." 9 The fact that the student body of a
J., dissenting)).
113. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (stating that "the State has a substantial interest that may
legitimately be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive con-
sideration of race and ethnic origin.").
114. Id. at 272 n.4.
115. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 555-56. The investigating agency was the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) Office for Civil Rights (OCR). Id. at 555. The investiga-
tion revealed that Texas had "'failed to eliminate vestiges of its former de jure racially dual sys-
tem of public higher education, a system which segregated blacks and whites."' As a result of the
investigation, Texas submitted a compliance plan called the "Texas Plan." Id. In 1982, Assistant
Secretary of Education Clarence Thomas formally informed Texas governor Bill Clements that the
Texas Plan was insufficient because the numerical goals for African-American and Hispanic grad-
uate school enrollment did not meet the state's commitment to enroll them in proportions equal to
their representation among all graduates of state undergraduate institutions. Id.
116. Id. at 555-56.
117. See id. at 555 (noting that until the mid-1960s Mexican-American students were segre-
gated in on-campus housing, and African-American students were prohibited from living in or
even entering white dormitories).
118. Id. at 558. The district court also noted that in the late 1960s U.T. Law offered race-
based scholarships which, ironically, were for whites only. Id. at 557; see also Robert S. Chang,
Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the Dream That Is America, 23 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1115, 1117-19 (1996) (arguing that the use of a "narrow temporal framework" by
opponents of affirmative action to evaluate present effects of past discrimination fails to consider
the broader societal effects of past discriminatory practices).
119. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action For Whom?, 47 STAN L. REV.
855, 877-78 (1995) (noting the wide disparities between African-Americans and Anglos in both
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top-quality law school, in a state where Anglos constitute little more than half
of the population,2" would become nearly all-white if affirmative action
were eliminated from the admissions process 2 ' is ample evidence that there
exists some form of discrimination or lingering effects that go far beyond
formal race-based admissions barriers. Furthermore, the fact that severe racial
segregation still exists today in the nation's educational system'22 is evidence
of the pervasive societal discrimination which evades all attempts to eradicate
it. 1
3
The Fifth Circuit also erred in finding that the proper scope for evaluating
the need for remedial action is U.T. Law itself. Citing Wygant, 24 the court
narrowly held that U.T. Law could not initiate any race-based measures except
those narrowly designed to eliminate the effects of past discrimination within
the institution itself.2 5 By so holding, the court blatantly ignored the
incontrovertible nexus between higher education and society.'26 Although the
link between government construction contracts and societal discrimination
may be ambiguous, higher education-and law in particular-provide society
with leadership, a forum for dissemination of ideas, and a laboratory for
intellectual and political development.2 7 Law, more than any other pro-
fession, is inextricably linked to our social fabric, government, and political
processes. 2 The detrimental effects of segregated law schools have a
tremendous ripple effect reaching into every facet of society.'29
economic and educational success).
120. See Robert M. Berdahl, Understanding Hopwood, TEXAS ALCALDE, July-Aug. 1996, at
16, 17 (U.T. President noting that the State of Texas will have no ethnic majority by the turn of
the century).
121. See Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 573 (stating that, in the absence of race-conscious ad-
missions, the 1992 entering class would have included, at most, nine African-Americans and eigh-
teen Hispanics). In addition, it should be noted that while these twenty-seven students might have
been offered admission to U.T. Law, the number of minorities actually accepting offers might be
much lower. In the absence of affirmative action, the homogenous academic environment could
actually deter qualified minority candidates from accepting spots in the entering class. According
to the Dean of U.T. Law, competition between elite law schools for highly-qualified minority
candidates is "very fierce." Interview with M. Michael Sharlot, Dean of U.T. Law, in Austin,
Texas. (June 19, 1996).
122. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 554 (noting that in Texas alone there are desegregation
lawsuits pending against over 40 school districts, and recognizing Texas' history of intentionally
resisting court-ordered desegregation).
123. See id. at 570-73.
124. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (stating that general soci-
etal discrimination is not grounds for remedial action in a particular arena that does not itself
overtly show the effects of past discrimination). Judge Smith also used Croson, holding that the
scope of remedial action extends only to the governmental actor that had previously discriminated.
Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 954 (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 499).
125. See Hopwood 11, 78 F.3d at 954.
126. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that "the
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas .... (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
127. See infra notes 157-180.
128. See Mary Kay Lundwall, Increasing Diversity in Law Schools and the Legal Profession:
A New Approach, 14 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 147, 148 (1994) (noting the extraordinary influ-
ence the legal profession has in politics and government).
129. See generally Okechukwu Oko, Laboring in the Vineyards of Equality: Promoting Diver-
sity in Legal Education Through Affirmative Action, 23 S.U. L. REV. 189 (1996) (arguing that
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Moreover, the court passed over the fact that while institutions of higher
education have been formally opened to minorities, minorities are still
tremendously underrepresented in undergraduate and graduate programs
nationwide, including law. 3' Socialized biases 3' that extend far beyond
formal admissions barriers cannot be quantified 3 2 or eliminated by merely
"opening up the doors" to disadvantaged racial minorities; there still exists a
pervasive discriminatory atmosphere in society'33 that disadvantages many,
and thus, justifies race-based remedies.'34 As stated in The Civil Rights
Cases,"' remedial action is justified as long as there are lingering effects of
societal discrimination permeating all areas of society.'36
While optimistic scholars hope for a color-blind society in which race
conscious measures are unnecessary,' 7  pervasive inequities and
racism, both intentional and unintentional, creates invisible but real barriers to African-Americans
that limit their potential for personal and professional development and perpetuates negative per-
ceptions about African-Americans).
130. See generally, Kenneth S. Tollett, Sr., The Case For Black Higher Education & Affir-
mative Action, 10-FEB NBA NAT'L B.A. MAG. Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 13 (discussing the persistent
existence of an African-American "underclass" and recent declines in African-American enroll-
ment at institutions of higher education). In addition, the underrepresentation of minorities in law
can be seen not only by looking at overall social demographics, but also by comparing the per-
centages of minority college graduates to the percentage of minority students enrolled at law
schools. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 558-61 (pointing out that U.T. Law's original percentage
goals for preferred students were approximately equal to their percentages of all Texas college
graduates). While much contemporary legal scholarship has focused upon the plight of African-
Americans, statistics also show that Hispanics in America face equal if not greater challenges.
While this may in part be due to language and educational barriers arising from immigration,
Hispanics as a group are the least educated major ethnic group. While they represent about nine
percent of the U.S. population, only three percent of attorneys and approximately five percent of
first-year law students are Hispanic. Brest, supra note 119, at 883-87.
131. Justice Powell noted the existence of socialized biases in Bakke, stating that the "percep-
tion of racial and ethnic distinctions is rooted in our Nation's constitutional and demographic
history." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291.
132. See Beschle, supra note 52, at 1142-45 (stating that many opponents of affirmative ac-
tion were the same voices once opposed to removing formal racial barriers, contending that indi-
viduals in society do not begin bias-free, and stating that just as society must constantly strive to
maintain law and order, it must constantly work to eliminate the inherent trait of individuals to
discriminate against those who are least like themselves).
133. See Frank Adams, Jr., Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative Action Can
Save Historically Black Colleges and Universities, 47 ALA. L. REV. 481, 510 (1996) (noting,
among other factors, the severe psychological barriers to racial equality that defy traditional at-
tempts to eradicate racism by "leveling the playing field").
134. See Tollett, supra note 130, at 13 (arguing that the persistently wide gaps in income
levels, educational attainment, life expectancy, incarceration, and political representation are indic-
ative of a continuing racism permeating society).
135. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that while remedial action is not
meant to be permanent, it is justified as long as there is continued discrimination in society).
136. Oko, supra note 129, at 191-94 (arguing that racism presents such a severe threat to the
stability of this nation that the government bears the responsibility of allowing minority represen-
tation in society through affirmative action programs). For a discussion of the continued need for
affirmative action in the face of societal discrimination, see generally Tollett, supra note 130. In
Texas, for example, these lingering effects are especially prominent. For minorities, particularly
African-Americans and Hispanics, assimilation into society has been slow and inconsistent. This
reflects "the effects of centuries of political, social, and economic discrimination that Americans of
darker skins have endured in this society." ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 98.
137. See generally Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 759 (1995) (arguing that race-neutral jurisprudence is the only way to
achieve nondiscrimination). Other scholars argue that even academic diversity should be entrusted
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discrimination in society illustrate the need for continued race-based measures,
both as a remedy for past discrimination and a vigilant means of achieving the
compelling goal of a nondiscriminatory society. 3 '
B. Challenging the Bias of Merit: The Search For Standards
Opponents of affirmative action contend that such programs unfairly
discriminate against whites who have better qualifications for the desired
positions.'39 In support, they often cite anecdotal evidence of a white student
with higher test scores or grades displaced by a "less qualified" minority."
Such divisive arguments invariably stir deep emotions on both sides of the
debate, but lost in the rhetoric is the silent and erroneous assumption that
higher test scores and grades are incontrovertible measurements of merit. This
has been challenged as perpetuating inherent systemic biases. 4 '
The most common "objective" measurement of law school applicants, the
Law School Admissions Test (LSAT), is generally considered (along with
undergraduate grades) 42 to be an accurate indicator of the ability to succeed
in law school.'43 Critics charge that standardized tests are, in reality, a
"general, but imperfect, indicator of merit" rather than a concrete identifier of
"to the same forces that govern diversity in our private lives." Chen, supra note 108, at 1910.
While noble in principle, such blind trust ignores the inherent human tendency to discriminate
against that which is different or unfamiliar. Beschle, supra note 52, at 1142-45.
138. The compelling government interest in preventing discrimination is unquestionable and
well grounded in Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995) (stating that all discrimination is "poisonous and pernicious") (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149,
167 (1987) (finding discriminatory conduct adequate justification for race-based remedies);
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (noting "[tihe Court is in agreement
that ... remedying past or present racial discrimination . . . is a sufficiently weighty state interest
to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative action program") (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(stating explicitly that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate discrimination);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 494-95 (citing studies about the adverse effects of discrimina-
tion on students); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ("[elqual protection of the laws is
not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities").
139. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 790-91 (arguing that race-based scholarships and admis-
sions criteria deny higher education opportunities to those with "stronger credentials").
140. See Ken Feagins, 'Wanted-Diversity: White Heterosexual Males Need Not Apply,' 4
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1, 12 (1994) (offering a vignette concerning a white male who was rejected
by three medical schools even though his scores would have been acceptable for admission had he
been a minority applicant); see also Paul D. Carrington, Diversity, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1136
(1992) (arguing that racial classifications ignore individuality while focusing on stereotypes of
"overprivileged white males or underprivileged black females").
141. BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 120-33 (1996).
142. Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 121, 121
& n.3 (1993) (noting that not only is the test universally used, but almost all ABA-approved
schools require it in combination with undergraduate grades). While the use of undergraduate
grades to determine admissions has also been challenged as inaccurate for measuring the ability of
applicants to be successful in the legal profession, this article will limit the examination of the law
school admissions criteria to the LSAT. At U.T. Law, the admissions index combined grades and
LSAT scores, but the LSAT weighed more heavily than grades. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 557.
For a discussion of the inadequacy of using academic measurements as an admissions factor, see
generally C. WOODARD, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION
27 (1983).
143. Espinoza, supra note 142, at 127.
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intellect.'" While researchers consistently attempt to improve the
examination, 45 questions persist" about the ability of standardized tests to
provide an accurate representation of the qualifications or abilities that
potential students bring to law school. 47 The flaws in the LSAT as an
objective measure for screening applicants are threefold: 1) the test itself is
inherently culturally and racially biased such that it inaccurately measures the
"intelligence" of minority students;" 2) the ability of the LSAT to predict
success in law school is statistically weak;'49 and 3) the racially and
culturally biased nature of law schools and the process of legal education is
such that mere academic success in the traditional law school environment
bears little relevance to the ability to succeed as a lawyer.5 '
Moreover, if we dismantle the argument that race-conscious admissions
always' discriminate against whites, 5' we find that a diversity-oriented
selection process which emphasizes an individual's overall potential
contribution to the academic and educational environment cannot possibly
discriminate against "similarly situated" individuals.' Indeed, accepting the
reality that all students with a certain minimum level of qualifications are
adequately suited for law school'53 inevitably leads to the conclusion that
considering additional beneficial characteristics,' including diversity, creates
144. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 118 (explaining the admissions policies at U.T. and
stating that while test scores may vary between white and preferred candidates, no unqualified stu-
dents are admitted, regardless of race).
145. Espinoza, supra note 142, at 163.
146. Eulius Simien, The Law School Admission Test as a Barrier to Almost Twenty Years of
Affirmative Action, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 359; see also Oko, supra note 129, at 201-03 (dis-
cussing the effects of societal discrimination and poverty on the academic performance of African-
Americans, and concluding that only affirmative action can lead to increased participation by
African-Americans in the legal profession).
147. Simien, supra note 146, at 382-85 (noting various studies that have examined and criti-
cized the ability of the LSAT to predict success in either law school or the legal profession).
148. See Espinoza, supra note 142, at 121-28.
149. Simien, supra note 146, at 382-83; see also Espinoza, supra note 142, at 163-64 (stating
that the use of statistics correlating LSAT scores and academic success in law school is no more
valid than using data showing that family income also correlates well to academic ability, and
suggesting that law schools should show a nexus between standardized tests and the ability to suc-
ceed in the profession of law).
150. See Espinoza, supra note 142, at 127-29 (noting that the law school experience, includ-
ing casebooks, examinations, and traditional legal teaching methods are biased in favor of those
who because of their culture, education, and background are able to identify with and understand
the processes).
151. For an example of this perspective, see Ken Feagins, Affirmative Action or the Same
Sin?, 67 DENY. U. L. REV. 421, 422 (1990) (suggesting that white males are quickly becoming
the most discriminated-against class in America).
152. The general standard for equal protection analysis was set forth in F.S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (noting "the classification must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike") (em-
phasis added). But see Feagins, supra note 140, at 26-29 (arguing that all race-based classifica-
tions increase racial tensions by blindly favoring one group over another).
153. Nevertheless, as long as numerical or "objective" measures are the primary method of
evaluating most candidates there will exist a stigma, attached to minority or disadvantaged stu-
dents, of being inferior or unqualified. See Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical As-
sessment of the Concept of "Diversity", 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 145-46.
154. Such characteristics might include ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, superior aca-
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the potential for an ideal educational environment.'55 As stated by Justice
Harry Blackmun, "[iun order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race."' 56
C. Preserving Academic Freedom
Despite Judge Smith's dismissal of the diversity argument presented in
Bakke, 5' ample evidence suggests a continued compelling governmental
interest in promoting diversity in higher education. 5 Academic freedom, a
long established prerogative of institutions of higher learning, extends to the
choice of classroom curriculum, the appointment of faculty, and the freedom
to select a student body that best serves the interests of higher education.'59
This choice includes the "four essential freedoms"'" of determining "who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study."'' This "national commitment" '  to protecting such
liberties was emphasized in Keyishian v. Board of Regents163 and United
States v. Associated Press."6 These freedoms determine the very nature of
the nation's future leaders,"6 and the overwhelming First Amendment
interest cannot be overlooked."6 As stated in Sweatt v. Painter, "few
students... would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned." 67 Diversity in higher education serves not only as the compel-
demic or other achievements, financial hardship, physical handicap, nationality, life and work
experience, or being the legacy of a financial benefactor.
155. The "best qualified" students may or may not include those with high grades and test
scores. Hopwood 1, 861 F. Supp. at 578; see also Leslie Yalof Garfield, Squaring Affirmative
Action Admissions Policies with Federal Judicial Guidelines: A Model for the Twenty-First Centu-
ry, 22 J.C. & U.L. 895, 899 (1996) (arguing that as long as colleges and universities rely on "ob-
jective" criteria for admissions, they will be unable to achieve diversity in their student popula-
tions). While it is true that any consideration of diversity is itself a subjective evaluation, schools
must also recognize that test scores and grades are also subjective criteria, and justify their subjec-
tive choices on pedagogical grounds.
156. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
157. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 944-46.
158. See generally Vince Herron, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech Codes,
and the Pursuit of Truth, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 407 (1994) (identifying many of the virtues of a
diversified educational environment, including the dissemination, discussion, and consideration of
dissimilar ideas and values).
159. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957).
160. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
161. Id.
162. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312.
163. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (affirming a strong national commitment to "safeguarding
academic freedom," and declaring the nation's future dependent upon having leaders educated
through exposure to a wide range of ideas).
164. 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943) (stating that "right conclusions are more likely to be gath-
ered out of a multitude of tongues").
165. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
166. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (noting that petitioner's argument invoked the idea of a
competing First Amendment interest, and acknowledging the goal of diversity to be "of paramount
importance in the fulfillment of [the educational] mission").
167. 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
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ling interest as stated in Bakke," but also as the necessary and narrowly-
tailored means to safeguarding academic freedom."6
The benefits of such diversity extend to all of the students in the
classroom. 7 ' Just as minority and underprivileged students can benefit from
learning mainstream ideas and values, those students coming from an affluent
background or those without diverse cultural knowledge can better understand
and learn in a diverse environment.' For those unfamiliar with minority
cultures or ideas, it provides the opportunity to interact with and meet those
from different backgrounds and value systems,' an experience all the more
necessary for those entering the legal profession. 7 ' Students of all races and
backgrounds benefit from a diverse student population, for the process of
assimilation, rejection, and modification of a wide range of ideas constitutes
the very definition of higher education.'74
Some scholars, however, reject the value of race-based classifications as a
means of achieving diversity. They contend that such classifications
erroneously assume a consistent viewpoint from all people of the same color
or ethnicity.' This specious argument denies the inherent racism present in
American culture.'76 Racism has consistently transcended economic or class
lines,'77 subjecting even affluent or "undisadvantaged" minorities to violence
or discrimination.'78 While it would be improper to assume a consistent
viewpoint from all minorities,' logic dictates that a different viewpoint can
168. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
169. The very nature of academic freedom and the deference to schools to determine their
own needs is such that each institution has different priorities. The appropriate "fit" of diversity in
the role of furthering the compelling interest of academic freedom can best be analyzed by exam-
ining the particular and unique needs of each educational environment.
170. See Foster, supra note 153, at 138-39 (explaining the benefits to all viewpoints from an
exchange of diverse ideas).
171. See Brest, supra note 119, at 862-63 (presenting a comprehensive explanation of the
intellectual and academic value of diversity for both minorities and other students).
172. See Garfield, supra note 155, at 914 (noting the benefits to "innocent third parties"); see
also BERGMANN, supra note 141, at 106.
173. See Simien, supra note 146, at 369.
174. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 17 (noting "[e]ducation is the process of encountering
that which we are not, that with which we are unfamiliar, that which we do not know").
175. See Kennedy, supra note 137, at 775 (stating that skin color, ethnicity, and gender pro-
vide no "meaningful insight into an individual's mental processes"); see also Carrington, supra
note 140, at 1133-34 (ridiculing the affirmative action presumption that minorities are needed to
express some specific "minority" point of view); Chen, supra note 108, at 1907 (stating that "we
have sacrificed diversity within racial groups in order to accentuate diversity between groups").
176. See Oko, supra note 129, at 190-92 (arguing that racism today is still so pervasive and
damaging to society that it "threatens the very existence of this nation").
177. See Brest, supra note 119, at 878-79 (describing how racism and discriminatory attitudes
by whites affect African-Americans of all economic classes).
178. Although not every minority student is guaranteed to bring a unique viewpoint to the
academic environment, the fact that the overwhelming majority of African-Americans experiences
some degree of racial discrimination justifies the assumption of such a diverse perspective. Simi-
larly, just as the ability to provide a convincing writing sample does not guarantee qualities that
will be useful in law school, schools nonetheless have determined that the likelihood is great
enough to justify their use.
179. See Brest, supra note 119, at 862 (stating that while it cannot be assumed that all mem-
bers of a race have identical ways of thinking, it is likely that members of discriminated-against
minority groups have a viewpoint different from mainstream whites). Accepting the differences in
viewpoint between historically disadvantaged minorities and mainstream Anglos, while rejecting
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safely be assumed for those of ethnic or cultural minorities who have
historically been discriminated against. 8
D. Serving Community and Constituents
Even a pragmatic approach to evaluating the validity of race-conscious
admissions reveals a compelling state interest in protecting the political
interests of a university funded primarily by a state legislature.' From a
practical standpoint, a university must be able to demonstrate to its
constituents that it is an asset worthy of taxpayer support. 2 Just as private
institutions that depend upon alumni donations and endowments are given
great deference in allowing student bodies to include the children of wealthy
benefactors or alumni, 3 state institutions must be allowed the freedom to
include the children of their "benefactors." Courts have even allowed state
institutions the freedom to choose a student population based upon a need to
satisfy alumni who "provide monetary support."' 84 In a university heavily
dependent upon state funding, diversity properly achieves the compelling'
goal of serving the community and the school's constituents by allowing
access to higher education for all segments of society.'86
the "essentialist" theory that impoverished urban African-Americans share a common, monolithic
belief system with middle-class educated African-Americans, is the key to recognizing the impor-
tance of transcendent race lines in America. See Foster, supra note 153, at 139-41.
180. In his concurrence, Judge Weiner wrote that while he disagreed with the majority that
diversity is never a compelling government interest, he concurred in the judgment because he
thought U.T. Law's admissions process was not "narrowly tailored" to achieve diversity. Hopwood
11, 78 F.3d at 962. In particular, he noted. that only African-Americans and Hispanics were given
preferential treatment, rather than all possible groups that could contribute to a desirably diverse
environment. Id. at 966. Quoting Justice Powell in Bakke, he stated that diversity "'encompasses a
far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a sin-
gle though important element."' Id. at 965 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).
181. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 17 (stating that by the year 2000, Anglos in Texas will
no longer be a majority of the population, evoking the possibility that the University of Texas will
have to seek funding for a nearly all-white law school from a legislature whose constituents, as a
group, generally cannot be admitted). Such political considerations are significant.
182. Id. There is little dispute about the overwhelming societal benefits created by colleges
and universities. Nonetheless, if the benefits are demographically or geographically disparate,
political support may be difficult to obtain. Much like academic freedom, political considerations
are unique to each school and should be evaluated at the discretion of the individual institution.
See generally Chen, supra note 108, at 1878 (stating that "diversity must be a broad concept" and
that any affirmative action program that utilizes diversity criteria must "confer some tangible ben-
efit" that must "accrue to all constituencies within the academic community").
183. Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 946; see also Foster, supra note 153, at 143-44 (observing that
the children of alumni make up significant proportions of the student bodies at many of the
nation's elite colleges and universities, and noting that courts have held preferential treatment in
the admission of legacies, regardless of "objective" qualifications, to be nondiscriminatory).
184. See, e.g., Rosenstock v. Board of Governors, 423 F. Supp. 1321, 1327 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
185. If the alternative to alumni or constituent financial support is budget-cutting, increased
tuition, reduced opportunities for students, and limited enrollment, political considerations are
undoubtedly "compelling" interests for a state institution. See Berdahl, supra note 120, at 17 (not-
ing the reluctance of one state legislator to approve funding for an institution that does not admit
any of his constituents).
186. Critics of affirmative action who bitterly complain about lowered admissions standards
for minorities, fail to address the reality that students admitted under legacy consideration have
combined SAT scores that average thirty-five points below those of other students. Foster, supra
note 153, at 143. Legacy or lineage preferences are commonly used at many colleges and univer-
[Vol. 74:1
1996] HOPWOOD, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND HOMOGENEITY 287
E. Creating Access to the Law
The unique nature of law and the concurrent ethical and social
responsibilities imposed upon lawyers are such that adequate representation for
minority clients is of paramount importance.'87 Many of those most
disadvantaged or discriminated against cannot speak English, and an all-white
Bar is unlikely to provide the same aggressive advocacy for such clients as a
legal profession rich in diversity and representative of such values or
culture.' 8 Moreover, in light of past state-sanctioned discrimination against
minorities, there is a need for minority representation in the legal profession
greater than their representation in society at large.'89
Finally, the crucial role lawyers and the legal profession play in politics
and legislation also indicates the critical importance of diversity in the legal
profession as a means of preserving and facilitating access to the law"9 for
all members of society. 9' Such a disproportionately large number of legisla-
tors and politicians come from legal backgrounds, that a homogeneous legal
profession cannot reasonably be expected to represent adequately the values
and ideas of all citizens.'92 Just as the diversity of police departments has
sities, yet criticism of such preferences for the privileged is rare. See generally John Larew, Who's
the Real Affirmative Action Profiteer? THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June 1991, at 26 (arguing
that children of rich alumni constitute an elite class of individuals who receive significant benefits
based solely upon lineage); see also Chang, supra note 118, at 1123-24 (noting that many of the
University of California regents who recently voted to abolish race and gender preferences in
admissions have used their own influence as regents to help "relatives, friends, and children of
business partners into UCLA," sometimes in favor of "better qualified" applicants); JOHN K. WtL-
SON, THE MYTH OF POLITICAL CORRECTNESS: THE CONSERVATIvE ATrACK ON HIGHER EDUCA-
TION 151 (1995) (describing legacies as the "oldest form of affirmative action").
187. See Simien, supra note 146, at 368 (noting a lack of adequate legal services in many
African-American communities); see also Smith, The Role of Primary and Secondary School
Teachers in the Motivation of Black Youths to Become Lawyers, 52 J. NEGRO EDUC. 302, 369
(1983) (noting that while the number of African-Americans in the legal profession proportional to
their overall population has remained relatively constant over the last 60 years, the corresponding
ratio of Anglo lawyers has doubled); see also Simien, supra note 146, at 369.
188. See Simien, supra note 146, at 369 (noting that while the needs of African-Americans
can often be met by non-African-American lawyers, "similar backgrounds and experiences" enable
lawyers to better identify with and represent their clients).
189. See Brest, supra note 119, at 877 (citing statistics showing that while African-Americans
comprise about twelve percent of the general population in the U.S., they constitute only three
percent of all attorneys and approximately eight percent of all first-year law students). In response
to the argument that the eight percent figure indicates progress, it should be noted that attrition
rates for African-American students are significantly higher than for whites. Hopwood I, 861 F.
Supp. at 554 & n.3; see also Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race from Legal Education, 28 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM. 51, 52-54 (1994) (noting that attrition rates for minority students in accred-
ited law schools are more than twice as high as those for non-minority students).
190. A broad interpretation of "the law" includes not only attorneys and legislators, but also
judges, bureaucrats and administrators, government officials, prosecutors, civic leaders, politicians,
law teachers, scholars, and students.
191. See Brest, supra note 119, at 863 (noting that the legal profession possesses tremendous
social and political power); see also David E. Van Zandt, Merit at the Right Tail: Education and
Elite Law School Admissions, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1493, 1494 (1986) (reviewing ROBERT
KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES (1985) (noting that selection to "elite" law schools almost invari-
ably opens doors of opportunity and employment greater than those for students at nonelite insti-
tutions)).
192. Lundwall, supra note 128, at 148. In addition to race, economic status plays a critical
role in political participation. Lower socioeconomic status creates difficulties in becoming in-
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been justified as necessary to preserve public confidence in the police
system,193 in order to preserve social stability 94 in an increasingly diverse
nation, there must be a wide range of views and values represented by judges,
prosecutors, and attorneys. 95 In recent years it has become clear that
perceptions and understandings of the law are closely linked to cultural and
social backgrounds. 96 Consequently, a legal profession that reflects the
diversity of culture and ideas is imperative.'97
V. A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE
In order to develop a diversity-based admissions plan that can serve the
interests of all citizens, survive strict judicial scrutiny, and preserve the integri-
ty and quality of our educational system, institutions of higher learning must
begin by reevaluating and reconfiguring the "objective" academic criteria to
reflect a more responsible and unbiased method of evaluating merit. To avoid
the admission of "underqualified" students,9" schools may determine a point
above which a faculty can rest reasonably assured that all students have the
intellectual ability to succeed in the program. 99 By allowing this level of
volved in political campaigns or crusades that may not appear to have immediate, tangible results.
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 99.
193. See Foster, supra note 153, at 113-15 (arguing that race-conscious government policies
serve "forward-looking" goals of reducing racial tensions and promoting equality); see also
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that police departments could better
serve a community plagued by racial problems with a diverse and racially balanced police force,
and that an integrated public school faculty could provide a better educational environment that
one that is all white).
194. See Simien, supra note 146, at 369 (suggesting that without adequate minority represen-
tation in the legal profession, historically disadvantaged minorities will never have respect for and
confidence in the legal system).
195. See id. at 369-70 (stating that the positions of power and trust held by the legal profes-
sion demand increased representation by African-Americans, thus enabling them to participate in
the active development of society).
196. See Peter M. Shane, Why Are So Many People Unhappy? Habits of Thought and Resis-
tance to Diversity in Legal Education, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1033, 1039-40 (1990) (arguing that inter-
pretations of legal issues are greatly dependent upon "a web of relationships and past experiences"
unique to each individual).
197. See generally Robert L. Bach, Building Community Among Diversity: Legal Services for
Impoverished Immigrants, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 639 (1994) (discussing the role legal servic-
es play in the development and health of poor communities, particularly those with immigrant or
diverse populations).
198. Currently, most applicants to law school, when taking the LSAT, enter a code or codes
indicating school preferences. The grading system of the LSAT or other standardized tests could
be reconfigured to reflect only a form of "pass/fail" results based upon that school's requirements,
or even a more generalized "band" system grouping scores into more general categories than the
raw numerical and percentile score used today. This might prevent the petty argument that one
applicant is more qualified than another based upon a one point difference in the numerical score.
See generally Dannye Holley & Thomas Kleven, Minorities and the Legal Profession: Current
Platitudes, Current Barriers, 12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 299, 315-16 (1987) (discussing the need
for more accurate testing methods to select law students).
199. Allowing each school's faculty or administration to determine its own "baseline" figures
for academic qualifications would give schools the flexibility to select students according to each
institution's particular needs. Moreover, schools would not be bound to follow a standardized
approach developed by outsiders and would not necessarily be compelled to fall into the trap of
competing for students with higher numbers. In addition, instead of promoting themselves to po-
tential students through the presentation of "objective qualifications" of incoming students, such as
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"competency" to vary depending on the goals, abilities, and needs of the
institution, each institution's faculty would thereby preserve its own academic
freedom and ability to evaluate applicants based on the unique needs of that
particular institution.2"
Once this baseline figure is set, a school would be free to select students
with qualifications at or above that point based upon additional characteristics.
By declaring that all applicants who have met the cutoff requirement are
considered equally qualified with regard to this measurement,"' schools
could eliminate the argument that some candidates are inherently more
qualified than others2"e based solely upon tests scores or grades.0 3 In
addition to limiting the importance of numerical qualifications, 2°  schools
would solicit information from applicants about what qualities, characteristics,
or unique abilities they would bring to the educational environment. To
identify nontraditional or subjective characteristics,2" schools could require
GPA and LSAT scores, schools would better serve their diversity interests by focusing on out-
come-based statistics, such as bar passage rates, job placement figures, and even graduate income
statistics to advertise the quality of their program.
200. While schools known for their academic program and curriculum could focus on students
whose qualifications appear to be matched, schools with a more practical or clinically-based pro-
gram could select an entering class based upon qualities the school perceives to be preferable for
its curriculum.
201. Schools could formally state the general irrelevance (or limited relevance) of academic
numbers above a certain point as valuable to the law school community. In addition to eliminating
applicants' obsession with numerical minutiae, such a plan would also encourage alternative
achievement in areas that could substantially benefit an applicant and the legal community. In
order to preserve the incentive to perform well in traditional forums of evaluation in undergradu-
ate school, schools could also develop a plan for giving limited relevance and consideration to
marginal academic achievement above the requirements. This paper does not suggest a diminished
value for superior academic performance, but only proposes that other equally valuable criteria be
considered.
202. See Simien, supra note 146, at 374 (arguing that today's "objective" admissions stan-
dards subjectively choose among the qualified rather than simply identifying those capable of
succeeding in law or contributing to the profession).
203. This perception may be difficult to overcome, but one possible tool in promoting the
idea of a more holistic admissions system is the process of conducting interviews, no longer used
by many schools because of the cost and the large number of applicants.
204. Some scholars have argued that current GPA and LSAT-based admissions criteria are
faulty, and advocate developing an admissions process that is actually tailored to increase minori-
ty admissions to law schools. Russell L. Jones, The Legal Profession: Can Minorities Succeed?,
12 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 347, 351-53 (1987); see also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Thoughts About
Pursuing Diversity in Legal Education for Pedagogical Rather than Political or Compensatory
Reasons: A Review Essay on Stephen L. Carter's "Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby", 36
How. L.J. 291, 297-98 (1993) (arguing that current admissions criteria cannot measure "an
applicant's commitment to the common good or willingness to serve others," and suggesting that
as long as schools screen out incompetent candidates, nontraditional characteristics should be
considered as beneficial to an application).
205. At this point in the admissions process diversity characteristics assume a key role. See
supra note 154. In addition to looking at "traditional" indicators, such as letters of recommenda-
tion and resumes, committees could accept nontraditional media such as written or videotaped
essays, work products or records, or any other means by which the applicant believes they can
convey a unique contributing quality.
206. While critics of current law school admissions have only recently begun to question the
relevance and value of traditional forms of measurement, other academic disciplines have long
used alternative methods of evaluating applicants. For example, the admissions committee for the
U.T. Graduate Conducting program uses performance videotapes as the primary criteria for evalu-
ating candidates. This method precludes all other standards of merit, skill, or achievement. Such
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each applicant to submit a personal statement about life experiences,
educational aspirations, or career goals." 7
In addition to ethnic, racial, or other personal characteristics, hardship and
economic disadvantage should be taken into account for the purposes of
diversifying student populations. While scholars have suggested this approach
as an alternative 208 to race-conscious measures,209 others argue that such a
policy would fail to accomplish the goal of combating discrimination and
creating equal opportunity 2'0 by failing to distinguish between applicants
whose economic disadvantage is due to discrimination and those whose
methods "invariably tell us things about a candidate's ability to succeed in the profession that
mere grades alone cannot begin to indicate." Telephone Interview with Paula A. Crider, Professor
of Music at U.T. (Aug. 27, 1996). Although previous academic achievement and the abilities it
indicates will always be extremely important in law school, communication, performance, oral,
and interpersonal skills should be adequately recognized as significant in the legal profession. The
logistical difficulties of identifying valuable diversity characteristics are less imposing than they
appear. Current law school admissions policies often require writing samples and other indicators
of background, viewpoints, and unique or valuable skills. Christopher A. Ford, Challenges and
Dilemmas of Racial and Ethnic Identity in American and Post-Apartheid South African Affirmative
Action, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1953, 2022 (1996) (noting that the "raw material is already there" in
the law school admissions process).
207. In addition to providing the admissions committee with a useful writing sample, personal
statements allow applicants to identify what they believe are important abilities or characteristics
that cannot be measured by standardized tests or mere numerical evaluations. By allowing students
to "sell themselves" through these statements and other means, schools not only diversify their
class through their own criteria, but also are exposed to possible qualities and contributions not
previously considered or known by the faculty.
208. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Getting Beyond Racial Preferences: The Class-Based Compro-
mise, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 721, 726-28 (1996) (suggesting that a color-blind jurisprudence could
better address racial inequality by assisting disadvantaged people of all races). This approach,
though admirably principled, ignores the idea that racism and bigotry are inherent human charac-
teristics, and their elimination is not the successful result of a difficult struggle, but rather the goal
of a never-ending fight against human nature. See Beschle, supra note 52, at 1180-81 (stating that
racial prejudice and other biases are inherent and natural human behaviors, and that constant and
flexible corrective action is needed to combat them).
Other scholars suggest that class-based affirmative action should be used to complement
race-conscious measures. Ford, supra note 206, at 2019 (arguing that "class-based affirmative
action is clearly one approach that deserves future study" while stating that it shouldn't be substi-
tuted for effective race-conscious programs); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action
Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1950-51 (1996) (arguing for econom-
ic-based affirmative action programs but stating that such programs should not "divert attention
from the need for other, more effective public policies to combat both poverty and race-based
disadvantage").
209. Interestingly, while numerous critics of race-based affirmative action programs propose
class-based alternatives, our legal system and jurisprudence have never fully recognized economic
condition as a suspect class for the purposes of equal protection. See United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (upholding mandatory filing fees for bankruptcy); Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (outlawing fees imposed on poor people filing for divorce); Harper
v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 688 (1966) (stating "[lines drawn on the basis of
wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored."). If conservatives alter affirma-
tive action to be class-based, they will have, in effect, taken the first step in doing what social lib-
erals have unsuccessfully attempted for years. See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative
Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEx L. REV. 1847, 1847-48 (1996) (pointing out that "the
political irony of class-based affirmative action" is that "legal thinkers on the left have long
sought the legal recognition of economic inequality--or, even better, of 'class'--as a force in
American life and that Adarand is a step in that direction").
210. See Beschle, supra note 52, at 1180-81 (arguing that creating equal opportunity is a
compelling interest that may demand race-conscious measures designed to combat inherent human
biases).
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condition is not." Nonetheless, individuals from various economic
backgrounds can make significant contributions," 2 and in order to create a
true model for diversified higher education admissions, class-based
considerations must play an essential role.
Above all, race and ethnicity as contributing factors must be variable.2 3
Because one of the primary benefits of diversity is the exchange of a wide
range of ideas and values, it follows that an environment rich in certain
viewpoints will gain less from additional "similar" voices," 4 while a
heterogeneous educational institution would stand to benefit from almost any
diversification of viewpoint. By implementing a flexible program for diversity
admissions,2 5 schools can avoid the criticism that they are accepting
"quotas" of minority candidates.2 6 Furthermore, an adaptive definition of
diversity recognizes the dynamic elements of our society and allows for
changes in preferences that reflect the needs of a healthy university
environment.7
CONCLUSION
Despite the apparent setback dealt by the Hopwood H court, affirmative
action in higher education is far from dead in America, and continued
discrimination and bias in society are constant reminders that race-conscious
211. See Brest, supra note 119, at 897-99 (labeling class-based affirmative action programs
inefficient and not conducive to achieving the goals of affirmative action). While middle-class
members of an historically disadvantaged race might be likely to serve as role models or benefi-
ciaries for the minority community, the same might not be true for economically disadvantaged
whites who may or may not have a personal or cultural connection to their original economically
disadvantaged community. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Foster, supra note 153, at 161 (arguing that true diversity is "neither fixed nor final;
rather, it is local and contingent"). This proposal leaves open the possibility that schools could
choose admissions criteria that do not include diversity, and does not suggest that the law man-
dates diversity; rather, that diversity is both a compelling interest in and of itself and the means to
achieving the compelling interest of preventing discrimination. Thus, faculty, legislatures, or
whatever governing body determines the institution's interests would be free to choose what diver-
sity interests are best for them while remaining compliant with constitutional equal protection
rules against racial discrimination.
214. For example, a law school with a majority African-American student population might
have less to gain by preferencing African-American culture than it would by attempting to select
students of Hispanic or Anglo background.
215. These policies and academic values could be developed, within the accepted parameters
of "academic freedom," by the faculty, the administration, or even the legislature.
216. See Feagins, supra note 151, at 448-49 (arguing that preferential treatment of groups
erroneously assumes that each individual within the group has identical characteristics). This
paper's approach eliminates the problem of preferential treatment for groups by focusing instead
on individuals who can contribute separately to the academic and educational environment.
217. While African-Americans have generally been seen as the most victimized and dis-
criminated-against ethnic group, demographic and political changes may occasionally alter the
discriminatory landscape of America. Contemporary political movements and hostilities, such as
against Hispanic immigrants in California, Haitians in Florida, Vietnamese immigrants in Texas,
or even against homosexuals or religious groups may indicate the need for periodic adaptations of
what elements of diversity are desirable. In addition, the availability of a diverse population may
vary. For example, if a school in a state with a large Hispanic population is unable to find an
adequate pool of disadvantaged minority applicants, then less economically disadvantaged Hispan-
ics may present a greater asset to the school than if there were a deeper and more diverse pool of
Hispanic applicants.
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measures are needed.2 By recognizing the continued discrimination present
in society, as well as the far-reaching effects of past state-sanctioned discrimi-
nation and socialized biases, colleges and universities can implement remedial
measures that open the doors of higher education and the legal profession to
those held back by bias or disadvantage. In addition, we must acknowledge
the value of academic freedom and diversity by welcoming into the halls of
higher education viewpoints and ideas of every race, culture, ethnicity, and
individuality. Particularly in the law, we must take heed of the tremendous
ethical and moral responsibilities concomitant with the profession, and insure
that all citizens have access to a legal profession that is both understanding
and representative of all cultures and viewpoints. Diversity in higher
education, law, and society in general is both a compelling end in and of
itself, and the necessary and appropriate means to achieving the
unquestionably compelling goal of preventing discrimination and a return to
"separate but equal" educational systems.
As this country approaches a time where there exists no ethnic or racial
majority, the concept of diversity must be recognized as essential to the
survival of our nation, one in which race and culture are consanguineous with
various political, moral, and philosophical ideologies. We must accept the
inherent human tendency to be fearful of and biased against that which is
different or unknown, and utilize diversity as the single most effective
mechanism for vigilance against discrimination. The utopian vision of a great
potpourri of people, cultures, and ideas can never truly exist without diversity
and the substantial contributions it can make to our nation's future.
Kent Kostka*
218. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir.
1994) to strike down exclusive minority scholarship preferences, is not indicative of the future of
financial assistance for disadvantaged or minority students. Despite the apparently devastating
circuit rulings, the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue, and by applying a flexible diversity
rationale instead of strict racial classifications, scholarship awards could be used in a manner
beneficial to the concept of diversity.
* The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Julie Nice of the University of
Denver College of Law, without whose patience, help, and encouragement this paper could not
have been written.
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